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WOMAN, MAN AND THE PARADOXES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

.. . it is not necessary to argue that women use
power differently from men in order to make the
case for women's increased political power.

Iva Ellen Deutchman

Classical "textbook" definitions of democracy focus primarily
on the interactions of political elites,

working through formal

institutions, and only secondarily on the manner in which so-called
democratic processes affect thel masses.

A political system is

classified as democratic, citing Huntington, if "its most powerful
collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections
in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually
all the adult population is eligible to vote.
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Analysts then add

the need for citizen participation,

the presence of competitive

parties and interest organizations,

mechanisms for securing the

accountability of the rulers to the ruled and, ultimately, civilian
control of the military, the foundation for the state's monopoly
over the legitimate use of force

a

la Weber.

As Waylen emphasizes,

standard evaluations of a country's "democratic" character make use
of a top-down, not a bottom-up approach. 2
Two recent articles by prominent political scientists, focusing on questions of democratic transition,
1

suggest that the

major challenges to democracy currently rest with a need to secure
balanced representation among national and transnational decisionmakers

(Dahl),

on the one hand,

and competing qua conflicting

political and economic interests

(Almond),

on the other. 3

The

claims these authors make on behalf of democracy are unabashedly
normative, yet the indicators they employ to ascertain its presence
are fixated on institutional processes and elite roles.
spondingly,

scholars

"measurable"

pursuing

phenomena

and

empirical

analysis

"representative"

Corre-

(that

samples)

is,

rarely

consider the extent to which their data neglect real-existing power
imbalances, e.g. between the sexes, in long established democracies
as well as in transitional systems.

Nor does the "orthodox view of

democracy" consider the significance of unconventional political
roles played by women, which ultimately shape the civil society
deemed necessary for democratic transitions in the Second and Third
Worlds. 4

These are research questions that even the historical-

institutionalists among us leave up to "feminist" theorists.
One need not commission a battery of European panel studies of
however,

the multiple-regression sort,
arguments

advanced

"institutional

by

Her

Waylen.

democratization

does

in order to verify two
first

not

contention

necessarily

is

that

entail

a

democratization of power relations in society at large," with or
without the inauguration of new elites.

Her second is that there

is virtually no correlation "between playing an important part in
any

stage

particular

of

the

role

process

during

the

of

democratization

period

of

and

having

consolidation. " 5

any
The

political transformations taking place in Central/Eastern Europe
offer a multitude of day-to-day examples. 6
Operational

definitions

of

democracy deliberately
2

exclude

power-imbalances between women and men in the private realm, as if
these

disparities

occurrences.

were

random

rather

than

(almost)

universal

Rather than begin with a belief in women's rights to

participation in politics, Pateman has argued, the civic culture
concept employed by most analysts assumes their non-participation:
Its political focus is on the role of the upper SES
(male)

citizens as participants and decision-makers.

The balance of the civic culture is one that allows
these elites "to get on with governing" in the absence
of a politically active people .... Rather systematically

structured

inequalities

appear

as

individual

psychological and personal attributes that happen to be
distributed in a particular way. 7
Yet it is exactly this

"imbalance" that routinely and globally

affects women's ability to compete for public office and influence
public policy.
proliferation

We find ourselves confronted with a distracting
of

hyphenated-democratic

models--e.g.,

liberal-

democracy, social-democracy, and even authoritarian-democracy (in
cases like South Korea).
debates

over

labels,

More often than not we are consumed with

when

we

should be

rethinking

the

value

premises emobodied by democracy plain and simple.
Relying as they do on narrow definitions of participation,
citizenship, and civil society, the works of mainstream theorists
are of limited use to researchers trying to untangle the linkages
between the processes of "democratic transition" and the resurgence
of ultra-nationalist forces in Central Europe since 1989.
purpose

of

this

essay

is

to

articulate

several

The

gender-based

paradoxes inherent in formal democratic theory as they relate to
nationalistic

tendencies

in Central Europe over the
3

last

five

years.

The democratization of once-authoritarian systems has not

produced an equitable redistribution of power and resources between
millions of East European women and men, no matter what role the
former

might

revolutions

have
and,

played

hence,

in

bringing

about

regime-change.

their

respective

Nor can one

begin to

understand the threat that reemergent nationalism poses to the
consolidation

of

democracy

in

Central

Europe

without

first

analyzing the ways in which nationalism is directly tied to the
power imbalances of gender.
constructed

identities,

valuating difference.

Both gender and nation are socially

providing

a

way

of

configuring

In addition to organizing a

and

community's

links to nature and culture, these two determinants of otherness
give rise to specific divisions of labor,
recognizable structures of power. 8

as well as to easily

This author contends that a

majority of the new East European elites, heralding the rebirth of
the nation, have used the democratic process to render their female

compatriots permanent second-class citizens, equipping them with
fewer social and material rights on the basis of their preordained
status as the other.
For four decades, the states of Eastern Europe served as the
site of a major social experiment in relation to two existential
questions: namely, the Women's Question and the National Question.
Equality between the sexes has always been a prominent component of
Marxist ideology, at least in theory.
as

part

of

a

larger

system of

eliminate private property,

Gender inequality was viewed

exploitation under

capitalism:

ensure women equal educational and

employment opportunities, the heads of Communist Parties declared,
and

the

Woman

Question would

solve

itself.

Correspondingly,

proletarian internationalism was to provide the framework for a new
4

world order;

workers of the world would unite and overthrow the

oppressive classes.

Conflict between nations was seen to arise out

of a larger imperialistic quest undertaken by monopoly capitalists,
who fed their insatiable hunger for profits by conquering new
markets and enslaving new workers.
Since 1989 it has become quite clear that state-socialism
secured neither the genuine liberation of women, nor did it succeed
in wiping out

older forms

of

national

consciousness.

It

did

reshape the meaning of gender-identity and national identity in
each of the bloc-countries, however,
nections. " 9

"and (thus)

their intercon-

The collapse of those systems has precipitated another

deconstruction and reconstruction of both identities, and not only
within the East European borders.

No less affected by developments

of the last five years are the identities of Western Europeans,
whose plans for a Europe without borders

a

la Maastricht have been

altered by a series of Great Migrations, the likes of which have
not been seen since 1066.
In case the arguments introduced so far are not sufficiently
provocative, I will address an even more sensitive subject in order
to

demonstrate

nationalism,

the

namely,

"interconnectedness"

between

women's reproductive rights.

gender

and

Indeed,

the

actions of politicians in a wide variety of industrialized states
leave me no choice: since 1990, abortion has become the focus of
heated national

debate

in nearly every Central

European state

except Romania: in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak
Republics, in the war-torn Yugoslav federation, in united Germany;
let us also add Ireland to the equation.

At issue is not how

"politics" decides questions of women's reproductive rights but how
the issue of abortion rights is being used to define the terrain
5

upon which future contestations for political power will be waged.
The controversy over a woman's right to bodily self-determination lies at the heart of a larger debate over the future course of
the Body Politic, a struggle for symbolic capital, "the shaping of
politics through the coded discussion of reproductive practices.

1110

As Susan Gal writes, "the abortion debate is linked most closely to
the political sphere where new elites are forming at the same time
as they construct the cultural grounds to produce,
legitimate their own mobility.

justify and

Debates over abortion policy in

1111

Central Europe moreover reveal "how new groups are being defined,
how interests and justifications for action are being imagined, how
the

relationships

between

citizens

and

the

state

are

being

conceptualized and contested, as individuals and groups constitute
themselves for political action."u
Different

societies

have

historically

cultural meanings to the subject of abortion.

attached

divergent

Conditioned by the

Supreme Court's 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade, the US-American stress
on a constitutional right to privacy proves the exception to the
rule; the US tradition of individualism pits the privacy, autonomy
and responsibility of a given woman against the rights of a given
fetus.

Historically speaking,

Europeans

have

always

accorded

higher priority to notions of collective identity; some actively
reject the "unhealthy self-serving spirit of individualism" (albeit
only in relation to women).

One of the most striking features of

Eastern European politics since 1989 is the self-imposed silence
and/or virtual exclusion of feminists at the formative stages of
the abortion-policy debate.
It makes little sense to sing the praises of political change
without

a

commensurate

look

at
6

the

economic

consequences

of

democratization.

Gender defines the terrain upon which Central

European

hope

leaders

priori ties.

to

There is a

banner of democracy:

reconfigure

their

national

economic

consistent pattern emerging under the

the transition to market economics has not

been a kinder, gentler one for Eastern women.

The last five years

have seen the refeminization of many nurturance functions formerly
assumed by the state to ease the double (more accurately,
burden women faced as workers, mothers and wives;

triple)

families have

also witnessed the termination of subsidies for food, energy, rent,
and nurseries.

Disproportionately affected by record unemployment,

women can now be expected to relieve the state of the enormous
costs of caring for children, the elderly and the sick.
"the

end of

that

assumed

significant costs of biological and social reproduction,

instead

assigning

socialism means

most

of

these

the

costs

end of

to

a

state

In short,

individual

households,

as

capitalist systems have done."Ll
Embracing

the

rationale

of

the

market,

the

new

elites

recognize that "the gender organization of the capitalist household
cheapens

the

cost

of

labor

for

capital

by

defining

certain

necessary tasks--'housework'--as non-work." Hence, "the economies
of

post-socialist

Eastern

Europe

will

be

comparable cheapening" of domestic services. 14
care-functions

eliminates

the

need

to

viable

only

with

a

A privatization of

remunerate

this

work,

rendering it one of the state's essential cost-savings strategies.
Just how much capital might be accumulated for other purposes is
suggested by a European Community study conducted during the 1980s,
which found that "women's work" at home, if paid, would add an estimated 40% to the Gross Domestic Product of· the Member-States . 15
Consider recent developments in two countries at the heart of
7

Europe, evincing very different systemic experiences between 19491989.

Since 1990 both Hungary and united Germany have adopted more

restrictive abortion laws,

relative to the Eastern experience;

Hungarian "Defenders of the Fetus" went to Court in 1992; so did
conservative forces

in unified Germany.

Over the

last twenty

years, both Hungary and the West German state experienced negative
rates in population growth; a declining population is also an aging
population, presaging the "death of the nation" in the figurative
as well as in the literal sense.

An aging population is also one

that must be supported, at increasing cost to the state.
New abortion regulations adopted in Hungary and Germany since
1993 mandate the following conditions for terminating a pregnancy:
1) a woman must find herself in a "crisis situation;" 2) she must
undergo

obligatory

certified,

affording

accredit them);
three

days

counseling

3)

a

(by

material

experts

who

power-base

for

subsequent to counseling,

before undertaking the procedure;

doctors may opt not to perform abortions;

must

be

state-

officials

who

a woman must wait
4)

and 5)

hospitals

and

the price of

procedure, more than double the cost under the previous code, must,
for the most part, be paid by the woman herself.
is opposed by the current government

Because abortion

in each case,

many state

hospitals are exercising their "right" not to offer the procedure.
The irony is that the no longer existent German Democratic
Republic, which provided free and legal abortion upon demand for
the first trimester prior to unification, had the highest birthrate
of the three countries until 1990.
have dropped by 50%,
regions

by 400%

officials).

Since unification, birth rates

and sterilization rates have risen in some

(based on

interviews with Berlin and Leipzig

The all-German "reform-law," approved by the Bundestag
8

in June 1992, was to be coupled with an extensive social-benefits
package.

Before the final vote, parliamentarians postponed until

1999 all appropriations for a package that was to have included,
inter alia,

guaranteed day-care places for children over three,

subsidized c.ontraception, and job-reentry programs for mothers who
had dropped out of the labor force.

Thus old and new FRG citizens

who become mothers between 1992 and 1998 will have to do without
the infrastructural supports GDR-women used to take for granted,
forms

of

benefits

assistance West-German
of

the

new law.

(foreseen for 1996)

The

feminists
state will

in direct costs,

had espoused as
save DM 21

key

Billion

the National Health System

will save DM 15 billion per year, since a procedure subsequently
declared "illegal but unpunishable" by the FRG's highest court in
May 1993 cannot be performed at state expense. 16

The fact that 80%

of all abor.tions performed in Western Germany through the 1980s
were based on the social-hardship indicator testifies, in certain
respects, to the failure of the welfare-state vis-a-vis its women. 17
Rights are not only gender-based.

They are also rooted in major

class cleavages, given the fact that women have less access to paid
employment, earn significantly lower wages and must rely on lower
state pensions (despite the fact that women generally live longer,
and thus face higher costs over time)
Under

the

revised abortion

law

adopted by

democratically

elected Polish legislators, women who claim they need to terminate
a pregnancy for economic reasons must visit .an obstetrician,
gynecologist and a psychiatrist or psychologist. 18

a

Even if this

requirement' was not deliberately intended to show women that the
economic crises afflicting their daily lives

"are all in their

heads," it still suggests that women's inability to provide for
9

themselves and their offspring is merely an individual problem.
Women who reject maternity for reasons of financial insecurity or
lack of affordable housing, even in the former Wirtschaftswunderland of Germany, are judged to be "materialistic and unethical;"

they are charged with putting creature comforts (of child as well
as parent) above higher ethical values, such as life and the good
of

the

nation,

interested

proposition

nature

redomestication
political

a

of

of

women

impotence

joblessness,
refugees.

both

of

is

clearly at

liberalism
to

serve

officials

youth violence,

odds

and
as

with

the

self-

capitalism.

an

antidote
the

vis-a-vis

rising criminality,

The
to

the

problems

of

and waves

of

It is unclear how women are supposed to support more

children in the fa.ce of mass unemployment, privatization (resulti!1g
in

the

loss

of

their

apartments),

hyper-inflation

and

major

cutbacks in social services.
The regendering of democracy is a process made possible by the
"triumph

of

capitalism,"

equality in favor of

an

ideology

that

has

freedom and self-interest.

long

rejected

Now that the

countervailing forces of socialism have disappeared (as perverse as
its Soviet/East European manifestations may have been), there is
nothing

to

stop

the

multinational

forces

of

capitalism

qua

competitiveness from undermining the limited forms of legal and

social equality that had been cultivated under the old regimes.
Refeminizing

household

labor

renders

women's

work

invisible,

meaning it will not be counted as a contribution to national wellbeing (in contrast to "defending the Fatherland," for instance).
Yet women's declining economic opportunities are ortly the tip of
the proverbial iceberg.
Also subject to redefinition by way of national
10

abortion

legislation is the concept of rights under the classical paradigm
of liberal democracy.

This author learned, through undergraduate

readings ranging from Locke to Dahrendorf, that liberalism has as
its

focus

the

rights

of the

yet

individual;

even in Western-

democratic states, women's rights are defined largely in terms of
their group status.
rights

are

linked

to

As many a Supreme Court verdict shows, women's

neither
formal

"unalienable"

membership

in

nor
the

equal,

nor automatically

polity.

Male

rights

are

unalienable, if somewhat restricted in practice by conditions of
class and race.

Women's rights must be "earned," contingent upon

the discharge of an externally defined set of duties, the definition of

which

(in

Catch-22

fashion)

excludes

the

exercise of

certain rights.
is

Liberal-democracy

posited

largely

in

structural

and

institutional terms (first-past-the-post+ single-member-district
+

some

affirmative

(presence

of

action),

activist

as

opposed

left-libertarian

to

social-democracy

parties

+

with

some

proportional representation + some acceptance of quotas) . 19

As

classification

to

devices,

oversimplification.
hyphenated-types

of

Yet

these
if

terms

one

democracy

of

is

to

inevitably

fall

the purposes

of

determine

the

prey

comparing
impact

of

structures on political participation, then it is imperative that
one

consider

infrastructures

and structural

barriers

as

well.

Liberalism (including liberal-feminism) asserts the necessity of
equality of opportunity, while social(ist)-democracy focuses our
attention on equality of outcome.
circumvent

the

(in) equality

of

These distinctions nonetheless
condition

that

underlies

both

precepts, viz., the artificial distinction between the public and
private lives of women and men who would be political actors.
11

Women-in-politics may undertake a more concerted effort to promote
state support for nurturing-functions, but there are few countries
that offer both affordable quality daycare and the kind of familyfriendly working hours

(consider the late-night votes that are

standard-operating-procedure

in

most

parliaments)

which

would

enable women to acquire the experience and seniority they need to
become policy-makers in the first place. 20
Women's reproductive rights also lie at the heart of efforts
to redefine citizenship, be it national, regional or supranational
in character.

As Judith Shklar observed, the concept is too often

construed as a discrete act, not as a process of inclusion. 21 Rather
than

limiting

belonging,

citizenship

we

need to

economic standing.
a

recognition of

ending

with)

the

to

questions

recognize

it

as

a

of

legal-territorial

matter of political-

Democratic citizenship is meaningless without
"independent personhood,"
right

to

control

of

beginning with

one's

own

body

(not

and

to

participate directly in such bodies as might limit that right.
Under state-socialist rule, citizenship was viewed not as an
ethnic category but rather as an economic classification, in accordance with its
same

time,

the

"proletarian-internationlist" objectives;
"socialist

nation"

dependency rather than agency.

cultivated

at the

citizenship

as

Since 1989, citizenship itself has

been re-gendered; the idea of independent political, economic and
national agency has been reinstated for men.

Women's membership in

the national community. however, has been decoupled from membership
in the political community: female rights to independent citizenship have been suspended (for the wives of migrant workers) or, in
the worst cases

(Bosnia),

stripped away entirely.

Independent

personhood has been superceded by an older, common law emphasis on
12

the relationship between men and women as a family unit; a wife's
status is dependent upon the political-national standing of her
spouse, even within the framework of the Single European Act. 22
New World Order reasserts an ideology,
"women do not stand for themselves,

to cite Sapiro,

The

in which

in which their independent

citizenship is not a good in and of itself, but rather in which
they are viewed functionally and in relation to others." 23
Feminist

theorists

like MacKinnon and Young

suggest

that

women's meaningful political participation will only come about
when

the

liberal-democratic

notion

of

the

jettisoned in favor of the positive state. 24
to

protect

individuals who

negative

state

is

The former seeks to

already enjoy a broad

spectrum of

political and economic rights against the deprivation or curtailment of those rights.

The latter is one committed to securing the

pre-conditions necessary for an exercise of rights among those who
have not historically possessed them for reasons of class, gender
or race.

All of those new American Express offices in Prague,

Budapest and Sofia notwithstanding, membership has its privileges
only for the few.
Here we encounter a further paradox:

In theory, the liberal-

democratic creed, stressing individualism, legal rights, and the
inherent uniqueness of human beings, rejects the social engineering
employed by Eastern regimes in their 40-year effort to create and
mold "socialist personalities."

Yet a central feature of diverse

re-nationalization campaigns, in countries stretching from Poland
to

the

former

Yugoslav

federation,

is

their

use

of

gender,

reproduction, and ethnicity as natural-law categories rather than
as social constructions. 25

Democratic pluralist politics serves as

the vehicle by which new elites can promote an idea of the nation
13

that

is

both absolutist

Western states

have

and exclusivist

always

in nature.

Although

been inherently suspicious

of

that

irrational "tribal passion" known as ethno-nationalism, the leaders
of more established democracies do not seem particularly disturbed
by the fact that "the best promoters of the westernizing,
Communist values they hope to foster are local nationalists.

antiThe

1126

universal quality of citizenship embodied in the root word demos is
being supplanted by the selective designs of ethnos; the only thing
open

to

debate

in

places

like

Bosnia,

North-Ireland

and

Basquelands is the question as to which group constitutes

the
"the

chosen people."
Actual consent of the governed (women do account for 51-52% of
the

governed

in

Central

Europe)

does

not

appear

to

be

a

prerequisite for the national moral bond between state and subject.
Eastern women have not been able to maintain, much less to increase
the strength of their political representation once new multi-party
systems are introduced: their average share of parliamentary seats
fell from 33% to 10% in 1990.

For individual states the figures

decreased as follows after the first round of free elections: in
Eastern Germany,

from

33%

to

20%

(now 25%)

in the

all-German

Bundestag; in Hungary, from 21% to 7%; in Romania, from 34% to 4%;
in the Czech Republic, from 30% to 9%; in Poland from 23% to 9%; in
Yugoslavia,

from 19.1% to

(overall)

4.6%. 27

It is certainly the

case that parliaments under the old regimes were little more that
rubber-stamp organs for the dictates of Communist Party elites.
But what is "democratic" about regime transitions and new political
parties which consciously overlook and/or exclude women at the very
moment when parliaments can begin to exercise real power?
The significance of a reduced female presence in the national
14

parliaments

is

more

or

less

self-evident.

The

Polish Senate

allowed only one day of debate (August 3, 1990) on its first law
proposing a total ban on abortion.
to take to the floor,

Of the ten speakers permitted

seven men favored the proposal, while the

three women expressed their opposition to the bill
woman favored even harsher penalties) . 28
10% of the Polish Senat and Sejm.

(though one

Women comprise less than

The democratic deficit at work

in Warsaw parallels the dearth of female parliamentarians in the
Irish Republic, which insisted on exemptions from "social rights"
that might affect abortion policy as a condition for signing the
Maastricht Treaty. 29

By contrast,

increasing numbers of female

delegates to the directly elected European Parliament

(25% as of

this writing) have, with a little help from the European Commission
and the Court of Justice, pushed that body towards a realization of
"social rights" and gender equality. 30
The

fate

of

women's

political

movements

under

recently

"democratized" systems has likewise been negative across the board.
Having

laid

the

foundation

for

the

creation of

civil

society

through their courageous involvement in a wide array of opposition
movements

(Solidarity,

Civic Forum,

New Forum) ,

women now find

their participatory roles restricted to home and neighborhood.

The

opposition parties they helped to create--like Solidarnosc, called
into

life

through

the

actions

of

Gdansk

crane-operator,

Anna

Walentynowicz--have openly disassociated themselves from the issue
of gender equality.

But men are not solely responsible for women's

return to the domains of Kinder und Kr1che:

The need to seek "self-

identity" and autonomy in opposition to the state, internalized by
women prior to 1989, may well have laid the foundation for women's
self-marginalization vis-a-vis the world of politics since 1990.
15

The Eastern perception of Western feminists as "anti-family, menhaters" strengthens the position of nationalist forces.

Attempts

to rally feminist consciousness subsequent to the abortion debate
in Poland and Hungary have been modest at best. 31
us can deny that these women deserve a rest,

Yet who amongst
after the triple

burdens of the past forty years?
The

reconfiguring of Central European national

identities

necessarily involves a renewed separation of public and private
spheres.

Throughout

the

1970s

mobilized around the motto,

and

1980s,

the personal is

Western

feminists

the political.

A

variety of judicial and legislative organs ordained that they could
compete

in

the

public

governmental off ices,

arena

for

jobs,

pay,

promotions,

"all things being equal."

and

Of course all

things were not equal, beginning with the division of labor in the
private sphere.

The East provided a mirror image:

the political

was the personal, encroaching upon most aspects of private exist-

ence by virtue of the state's authoritarian character.

Few could

afford the luxury of staying at home, which is not to say that
women failed to develop a sense of personal identity through their
productive labor.

But "all things" remained far from equal.

Socialism did transfer to the public realm many functions
associated with traditional gender roles; it defined "society" as
the

family,

headed

by

Paternalist-Party. 32

an

all-knowing

Father-State

alias

the

Women's incorporation into the paid labor

force led to a reconfiguring of roles within the nuclear family,
enhancing
household.
infamous

their

relative

authority

and

"equality"

within

Unpaid labor became the domain of pensioners
grandmother

"feminization"

institution),

best

illustrated

of food lines in Eastern Europe and the
16

by

the
(the
the

former

Soviet Union.
are

being

State policies "empowering women" were perceived--or

perceived

in

familial authority of men,

retrospect--as

having

undermined

the

usurping their rights to make primary

allocative decisions (how does one allocate in a system plagued by
chronic scarcities?).
The newly "liberated" states of Eastern Europe are engaged in
a process of building civil society,
freedoms under the rubric,

carving out a new set of

"private sector."

This is not to say

that civil society must be built from scratch,
roles

in establishing the

foundation

for a

although women's

new society,

i.e. ,

through bartering networks and opposition groups that took shape
around their kitchen tables,

have quickly been forgotten.

The

paradox here is that public power is being used for the purpose of
dictating not only the boundaries but also the contents of the
private

sphere.

The

remasculinization

of

the

public

sphere

(politics) in newly democratizing states is packaged and defended
as a rehabilitation of the private sphere (family).
Many former "pro-democracy" dissidents who have moved into
positions of legislative and ministerial authority since 1989 are
eager to consolidate not only civil society but also new capitalist-market relations.

Since the family used to constitute the only

space available for privacy and solidarity under socialism,
served as the forum for anti-politics.

According to Gal,

it

"Anti-

politics identified the private sphere as that in which men could
act as free agents, and anti-politics implicitly required women to
maintain that sphere in material and conceptual terms,

insisting

that women should want to be havens against the heartless state. " 33
Hence,

the private sphere under the old regime was not really the

preserve of women but rather a space expropriated as an ersatz17

forum for men's oppositional-democratic politics.

Where women were

once expected to offer support and comfort against the systematic
persecutions of the socialist state, they are now expected to serve
as

havens

against

the

arbitrarily-imposed

sufferings

of

the

heartless market.
Dissidents-turned-politicians and communists-turned-nationalists share at least one critical orientation: abortion,

in the

view of both camps, has little to do with a woman's right to selfactualization
Whether

she

and

lots

resides

in

to

do

with

Ireland,

the

national

Poland,

moral

ideal.

Germany or Serbia,

a

women's nationality is no longer defined in terms of her voluntary
allegiance

to

a

particular

political

system.

Rather

it

is

construed as the foundation a larger moral relationship between the
state

and

policy).

its

subjects

(read:

women

as

the

objects

of

state

The bond between the state and its female subject is

reduced to a

restored bond between husband and wife.

Former

dissidents and old nationalists both appear to "pre-suppose a state
built on a moral consensus, one that represents a national/ethnic
unity, one in which there is little public debate because someone
else decides what is best for the entire community. " 34

Both are

fighting for the right to be that "someone;" that is, each side
struggles for the power, not in order to secure a compromise but to
impose its own vision of what the national moral consensus ought to
become.
National experts find it hard to believe that average citizens
are capable of making decisions for themselves.

Members of the

legal and medical professions have joined in the debate, eager to
secure their own authoritative turf.

Liberated from the bonds of

Communist Party-justice, lawyers may court one of four autonomous
18

legal entities: the mother, the fetus, the father and
The medical profession,

II

society.

1135

though often split over the wisdom of

criminalizing abortion, is similarly interested in reclaiming its
own expert-space between family and the state.
doctors,

lawyers,

former

dissidents,

or

The claim that
ultra-nationalist

politicians "know better" is easily grasped by those who have been
subject to the dictates of the omniscient vanguard party over a
period

of

[Eastern

four

decades.

nostalgia],

a

Herein
belief

lies

that

if

an

element

only

a

of

Ostalgie

"paternalistic

someone" would take charge again, "he" would make the problems of
inflation, unemployment, homelessness, criminality all go away.
The regendering of public/private spheres raises another set
of questions concerning the relationship between Church and State
in

post-modernist

and

post-communist

society.

Politicians,

spiritual leaders, intellectuals, teachers and parents everywhere
complain about the breakdown of values in society, usually a codeword for "family values."

The constitutional separation of church

and state secularized Western society, thereby "delegitimizingll the
inordinate power of institutionalized religion in the conduct of
public affairs during the postwar era.

Formerly a channel for

fundamental opposition (against godless communism qua totalitarianism), the East European Churches find themselves delegitimized by
virtue of the fact that they are no longer the only oppositional
game in town.

Joining forces with emergent groups of professional-

political Christians

(the C-parties),

religious authorities not

only desire to avenge themselves vis-a-vis their former adversary,
the "godless state," they also need to nip in the bud the countervailing amoral powers of a globalized market promoting the flock's
selfish obsession with material success.
19

In order to guard its

authority vis-a-vis the market, the Church must, paradoxically, really itself with the state, while placing itself above the state.
The

institutionalized

churches

on

both

sides

of

the

old

frontline envision themselves as the only force capable of filling
the "black hole" of the current value-crisis.
of interesting East-West comparisons.

This raises a number

Christian Democrats in the

FRG saw themselves as surrogate Church leaders in the 1992 abortion
debate, even if they could not explicitly invoke the teachings of.
the

Catholic

Church

(outside

of

Bavaria)

without

the

risk

of

redividing the not-so-united German population (and perhaps risking
another Thirty Years' War, albeit by other means).

Unification has

brought 15 million potential Protestants (more likely, agnostics)
into the national fold; thus the all-German balance between the two
religious communities has shifted heavily in favor of the latter,
whose teachings allow for individual interpretations of the Bible
and, hence, a woman's right to choose.
The power of the Church in Ireland derives from a

serious

imbalance among the major sectors controlling society: relatively
stable

"democratic

institutions"

coupled with very

economic structures give the Church room to maneuver.
ly,

very shaky,

unconsolidated political

structures

ineffective
Concomitantin Poland,

wedded to dire economic conditions, enables the Catholic Church-the symbol of Polish nationalism for over 1000 years--to fill a
substantial
speaking,

power

a

very

vacuum.
strong

In

Germany

economy,

an

one

finds,

relatively

overdeveloped network

of

judicial institutions, and many decades of governmental experience
among

the

"Christian parties;"

hence,

there

is

little

"policy

space" which the institutional Church can seek to occupy directly.
As far as the liberal principle of self-determination is concerned,
20

the policy outcome is more or less the same for women seeking to
terminate pregnancies in Ireland, Poland and united Germany.
One

variable

is

conspicuously,

glaringly absent

from

all

official pronouncements regarding abortion and morality on the part
of Church and State: Where are the men? · The rhetoric of politicians and clerics everywhere leads us to believe that millions of
women world-wide, including unwed welfare mothers in the US, are
producing their children by virtue of Immaculate Conception (which
may be why the Church is so active in dictating the terms of
debate).

The Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] has gone so far as to

propagate

the

ideal

of

the

"fruitful virgin-mother"

(!)

since

1990. 36

If governments were truly interested in ending abortion as
"the taking of human life," then their primary concern would have
to be that of preventing unwanted pregnancies.

Leaders in these

countries have not been willing to expand access to sex education
and contraceptives.

Indeed,

many have sought to limit women's

freedom of choice in these areas as well, e.g., by removing four
brands of the Pill without replacement in Poland, and by terminating the provision of free contraception for all women in Eastern
Germany. 37

.

Women will not stop searching for ways to terminate

pregnancies merely because the procedure is declared illegal: this
is precisely the reason why some three million women die each year,
according to UN statistics.
The

"value debate"

foregrounded by the

rather duplicitous in nature;

abortion

issue

is

it embraces the ideal of gendered

morality, also known as the double-standard.

If abortion opponents

accept the Catholic postulate that life begins at conception, then
more would have to admit the logical inconsistency of tolerating
21

exemptions for abortion in cases of rape, incest or fetal deformity, exceptions found in all of the riew national laws. 38

It is well

known, however, that such cases inevitably entail higher costs for
the

state,

i.e.,

hospital care.

in the form of orphanages,

foster-homes,

and

All too often the anti-choice forces appear to be

more pro-birth than pro-life.

Since women who abort may be subject

to automatic excommunication from the Catholic Church, would it not
be morally consistent to excommunicate those who impregnate women
against their will,

through deliberate acts of unprotected sex,

marital rape or incest?
One recurrent theme in the European parliamentary debates over
reproductive

rights

since

1989

has

been

that

women

lack

the

capacity for moral judgment, with the possible exception of female
parliamentarians willing to rescind these rights.

This signifies

a return to the can't-use-your-uterus-and-your-brain~simultaneously
thinking of the Victorian era.

Yet women are exhorted to return to

their "natural" roles, one of which has always been to bear primary
responsibility for the moral education of their children.
women be
virtues

expected to

transfer moral

they themselves

capabilities

do not possess?

Can

and national

Alternatively,

is

it

conceivable that whatever "moral" lessons that women impart at home
will be internalized by their sons but not their daughters?
Anti-choice politicians in Ireland, Poland and Germany, inter
alia,

have repeatedly invoked the phrases a Catholic Ireland,

a

Catholic Poland, in a Christian Europe, as has the Pope himself. 39
Having visited the former Nazi concentration camps of Auschwitz,
Birkenau,

Bergen-Belsen,

and Dachau,

send cold chills down my spine.

I confess that these terms

One hears little about the moral

outrage expressed by a Polish-soldier-turned-Pontiff between 1938
22

(Nuremburg Race

Laws)

subjected to barbaric

and 1945,

when

sterilization

thousands

of

''experiments"

women were
(e.g.

having

their wombs injected with sulphuric acid) at Block-House Number Ten
in Auschwitz.

How often does the Pope speak out against manifesta-

tions of resurgent anti-Semitism in Poland, including statements by
the country's leading Catholic, Lech Walesa?

How much Vergangen-

heitsbewaltigung has taken place within the Vatican itself, which

signed

accords

with

German

and

Italian

fascists,

indirectly

clearing the way for forced abortions among millions of non-Aryan
women, to prevent them from bearing allegedly lebensunwertes Leben
["life not worth living"].

Will those intent on purging Europe of

its non-Christian influences turn a blind eye to abortions among
Europe's

few remaining Jewish inhabitants,

its

Islamic

"guest-

workers," its Romanian Gypsies, its Kurdish and Algerian refugees?
The abortion issue, in many respects,

is also embedded in a

debate over the end of absolutist ideologies.
which

draws

upon

"ineluctable,

immutable

Like Communism,

historical

laws"

and

truths, Catholic theology ascribes to an unchallengable, infallible
set of dogmas and moral-absolutes (this author experienced thirteen
years of Catholic schooling).

The Polish, Irish and Croatian cases

illustrate the the Catholic Church's desire to
"consensus" on the voting public;

impose

its own

it does not seem prepared to

tolerate negotiated "compromises" as the foundation of democracy;
indeed,

the

most

recent

Papal

encyclical

exhorts

Catholic

politicians to violate the separation of church and state.
Consider, further, the initiation of war in the former Yugoslav federation,

after 40

years of official

atheism:

On the

occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989,
Slobodan Milosovich made

a

virtually seamless
23

transition

from

"godless Communism," as head of the Serbian Communist League, to
chief

defender

of

the

Serbian Orthodox

faith.

His

religious

rebirth was quickly matched by the renaissance of Catholicism in
Croatia,

and the sudden importance of one I s Moslem heritage in

multicultural Bosnia.

Catholicism did not stop the Slovaks from

seeking a "Velvet Divorce" from the Czechs, however.
Conflicts over reproductive rights moreover reflect a
struggle to control the future interpretation of national history.
It is quite striking that the very East European policies which
helped

to

secure women I s

involvement

(meaning they were pro-natalist,

in

the

paid labor

not pro-woman)

eliminated as the Legacy of Communism.

force

are now being

Old and new forms of social

chaos and conflict are directly attributed to women's irresponsi--

ble, self-serving propensity under the old regimes to work outside
the home,

significantly impairing the health and well-being of

their own families. 40

The (fictional) image of the angry, sexually

aggressive feminist, intent on destroying domestic harmony, eagerly
undermining her husband's authority and health is juxtaposed--in
Hungarian election posters,

for example--against the restorative

powers of the benevolent wife-mother,
peace in the national household. 41

nurturing guardian of the

Attempts to preserve subsidized

daycare, guaranteed sick leave, free contraception and abortion are
discredited,
policies were

suggesting that women who took advantage
themselves directly responsible

of

such

for promulgating

these policies, in violation of natural law.
Thus women who insist on maintaining social policies that
enabled them to combine career and family must have been the real
"Communists" all along: never mind the fact that women in the East
held even fewer seats at the highest levels of government than did
24

those in the West.

Women are rendered the other,

allies of the

Communists; the new state must rescue the nation from the debilitating "mothering" of socialism which made men weak. 42
of

Restoration

the cult of domesticity becomes a strategy for resuscitating

national

culture;

gender

polarity

is

essential

for

the

reestablishment of the social qua the national order.
If women are to blame for their own exploitation under the old
regime, then the Eastern men re-establishing themselves in the new
organs

of

state power,

must have been the

real

anti-Communist

resistance fighters [though very few appear to have had significant
prison records or experiences with democracy gleaned during years
of exile abroad;

notable exceptions are Vaclav Havel and a

Bundnis '90 delegates in the German Bundestag].

few

The net result is

that Eastern and Western feminists are denied an opportunity to reconsolidate the political identity of their respective movements:
To be pro-nation is to be anti-feminist.
The truth is that women who are blamed for (and also expected
t o ~ for) major economic disruptions of the last five years have
had virtually no say in the determinc;1.tion of national economic
policies over the last four decades,
substantial democratic deficit.

highlighting once again a

Textbook definitions of democracy

specify the principle of majority rule, coupled with the protection
of minority rights.

Comprising the demographic majority in all of

the Central European states, women are treated like minorities, yet
the only "protection" they receive is exclusive in nature.

The

female experience with institutional democracy has been one of
regulation

and

representation.

relegation,
11

not

to

mention,

"taxation

without

The post-communist era is characterized by a

strong aversion to state intervention, on women's behalf, a delayed
25

r'eaction against the interference of the all-powerful state prior
to 1989.

What is not so clear is why there is so little aversion

to state actions when it comes to restricting women's rights and
regulating their bodily functions. 43
The need to protect the

"morally" weaker sex becomes the

justification for re-institutionalizing patriarchy.
"protection" reappears in many guises.

The theme of

An alleged need to defend

women against their own moral incompetence serves to guard the
nation against

racial mixing;

sexism qua nati vism equates

the

quality of a woman's character with the purity of her offspring's
blood.

A nation must moreover protect "its" women against the

allegedly insatiable, barbaric sexuality of other nations' men-even if authorities refuse to treat rape in marriage as a crime in
their own states.

Consider the Serbian poster depicting a woman

bearing an infant in one arm and a rifle in the other. 44

Women

embody the national Honor, the purity of its causes and, ultimately,

the rectitude of the national cause.

In reality,

women's

second-class citizenship is systematically interrelated with the
"inferior" standing of foreign minorities or ethnic groups.
The Irish and the Bosnian cases demonstrate most clearly that
women's

rights

"universal,"

are excluded from what are commonly defined as
border-transcending,

fundamental

Human

Rights.

Ignoring the fact that women are "human," present conceptualizations

reduce

"the

universal"

to

notions

of

a

"least

common

denominator" among men and women, as if none of the "differences"
between women and men have any bearing on their prospects for
equality. 45

Equality is globally construed as "sameness."

The fact

that Eastern women and men had to struggle together against a
repressive state for many years now makes it difficult for the
26

former to transcend this false universality.
This leads us into an ever denser ideological thicket, namely,
the

propensity of

Central

European

leaders

to

instrumentalize

national identity (defined in terms of jus sanguinis) as a strategy

for defending national sovereignty, despite all the verbal homage
paid to "interdependence."

Long-standing inter- and intra-national

conflicts and aggressive forms of economic competition, wedded to
self-centered notions of racial/ethnic/cultural superiority, were
subsumed for four decades under the bloc-based imperatives of the
Cold War:

the enemy-without.

The Cold War has ended,

and the

Battle of Births--a form of war by other but likewise antidemo-

National leaders seek to root out the

cratic means--has begun.

enemy from within; targeted are women who marry outside of their

ethnic group,

as well as foreigners in their midst inclined to

generate more children than the

"natives":

Albanians,

Bosnien-

Moslems, Turkish and Algerian workers (who ironically adhere to the
kind of strict "family values" of which the indigenous population
has lamentably lost sight).

Milic explains that "mixed marriages

symbolize the possibility of mutual assimilation and integration
between different nations,
borders

of

Hungarian,

national
German

respective peoples

the possibility of transcending the

collectivity

and
are

Irish
11

with

leaders

dying out."

no

fan
Yet

taboos

the

attached.

fear

that

1146

their

strength defined

in

demographic/statistical terms bears little relationship to the real
"erosion"

[one

could

say

"pooling"]

of

national

sovereignty

witnessed within the European Union since 1957.
As Verdery observes, "however radical socialism may have been
in reorganizing

family

structures

and roles

at

one

level,

at

another its paternalism dovetailed perfectly with patriarchal forms
27

central to national ideas elsewhere in the West. " 47
declaration that

Ceausescu's

"the fetus is socialist property of the whole

society" finds its parallel in German Conservatives'
pro-choice proponents

linking of

(insisting that "my belly belongs to me")

with perpetrators of the Holocaust.

While Romania's methods of

promoting national strength through numbers prior to 1989 were more
draconian

than

those

employed

by

the

Federal

Republic,

the

principle is the same: women's bodies are to be appropriated as
instruments for the attainment of the state's reproductive needs.
Women who refuse to comply may be targeted as the new enemies of
the state.
The vehemence with which pro-natalist forces reject a woman's
right to bodily self-determination "owes its force partly to a
vital

symbol

rebirth. " 48

Croats,

of

social;i.sm' s

demise:

the

idea of

Consider the rhetoric employed:

Abortion

is

Genocide,

nation's

The Unborn Are Also

seventeen million

citizens, Our Hungarian Holocaust.

the

fetal

Polish

In Abasar, Hungary, abortion

opponents have erected an "Embryo Memorial;" pro-choice feminists
are labeled "the murderers of mothers. " 49

The nation cannot be born

again if fetuses, physical embodiments of the nation's future, are
sentenced to death by self-interested women. Nor can the nation,
emasculated by communism,

"be restored to health if

refuse to bear and nurture its 'fetal citizens' . 115 °

its women

From a demo-

graphic perspective, permitting more migration from countries with
high birth rates would easily resolve the problem of population
decline,

e.g.

in Germany. 51

The

nationalist

agenda,

with

its

xenophobic proclivities, renders this a politically unacceptable
alternative, however.
The Battle of Births is an attempt to restore some mythical,
28

organic,

holistic,

blood-based concept of national unity in the

face of a potentially explosive redivision of Central European
societies into major camps of Winners and Losers,
Outsiders.

Political-economic

fragmentation

is

Insiders and

a

function

of

multiple all-or-nothing turf-wars--over the redistribution of state
power, the ability to determine institutional paradigms, the right
to define policy priorities, and last but certainly not least, the
power to dictate the.dominant code of values for the decades ahead.
Woman as Nature is destined to live in the service of the
Nation, and she is to be controlled by Man, embodying the NationState.

Yet

the

process

of

national

"homogenization"

depends

heavily upon the bloodline of the father, as demonstrated by the
violation of Moslem women in Bosnia.

When rape coincides with war

it is dismissed as the "unfortunate but inevitable side-effect'' of
sending men off to make the ultimate sacrifice for the Fatherland.
What is unique, unprecendented, newsworthy about the use of rape as
a

strategy of war

in Bosnia-Herzegovina

is

its

scale:

Commission cited 20,000 cases in its January 1993 report:
were documented, 800 victims were known by name. 52

the

EU

3,000

These crimes are

not the work of individual soldiers, a few sexual oddballs out of
control;

these are gangs of soldiers operating.under government

orders, abusing women with the explicit intent of violating their
"protected

status II

and,

in

so

doing,

national qua racial/ethnic purity. 53

violating

the

norms

of

These are not acts of "ethnic

cleansing" taking place in Serbian holding centers but rather acts
of racialized impregnation; abused women are detained long enough
to ensure the birth of "Serbian" offspring--one case where it is
recognized that women are not parthenogenetic.

This defilement of

the womb renders a Moslem woman incapable of producing pure-blooded
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children for her own race, .another reason to blame women for the
death of the nation.

The Gebarzwang [compulsory child-bearing]

inherent in the denial of a woman's right to abortion and a form of
nationalized maternity deliberately imposed. through rape are two
sides of the same coin.
The

leveling

of

reproductive

rights

across

the

newly

democratized states signifies a new struggle for "the hearts and
minds" of European youth.

There is also an attempt to "redress"

the evils of Communist education in Poland and Eastern Germany
while post-Wall citizens are still an impressionable age;

Oaks

offers a compelling argument along these lines with regard to the
Irish case as well.

As their mounting sympathy for extremist

movements indicates, younger cohorts are easily manipulated, having
been

cut

adrift

by

substantial

cuts

in

youth

services

recreational centers, and cut off from economic opportunity.

and
Many

are still ensconced in national educational systems thrown into
chaos

since 1989

black"] .
channels

[ "what was black is now white,

white is now

Adolescents are generally denied access to meaningful
of political participation,

though they do have

some

experience at tearing down regimes and changing constitutions by
taking to the streets.

They are already disillusioned with the

"democratic process" as the_y know it: less than 50% of the eligible
Eastern voters between the ages of 18 and 25 participated in the
first

all-German elections

to

the Bundestag in December 1990.

Voting rates are on the decline across Central Europe,
Communists have been making a

and ex-

come-back in lots of surprising

places.
Finally,

the

incorporation of gender

into an analysis

of

resurgent nationalism highlights The Limits of Euro-citizenship and
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complications ensuing from a Europe without borders.

Article 8 of

the Maastricht Treaty is more significant with respect to those it
excludes--over 12 million long-term foreign residents, guestworkers, and refugees in the Member-States--than with regard to the
expanded

participatory

Nationals.
to

rights

it

accords

those

included,

EC-

Women in Germany, Poland and Ireland have long resorted

abortion

tourism.

National

law

enforcement

agencies

are

inadequately equipped to monitor the behavior of women without
subjecting each and every one to gynecological examinations

(the

politics of abortion in Ceausescu's Romania) whenever they cross
their own national borders.

Consider the West German case of

Katrin K., which illustrated the "unequal protection" of Germany's

dual-system approach through 1992.

In 1990, a 22-year old married

mother was searched and arrested on suspicion of abortion while
crossing the boundary between the Netherlands and the FRG.

The

young woman was subjected to a forced vaginal exam in a state
hospital, becoming a cause celebre when it was revealed that she
had fled to the West from Jena in 1988

(before the Wall's col-

lapse), where the procedure was still considered legal.
of the 14-year old rape victim in Ireland,

The case

denied the right to

travel to Britain after she was revealed to be pregnant, further
attests to the fact that women's rights of free speech and free
association are by no means equal to men's.
eventual

approval

of

RU486

will

pose

The European Union's

additional,

intractable

problems of implementation and control.
The reconstruction of national communities in Central Europe
has brought to light the inherent limits of democracy defined in
primarily

institutional

processual

variables

terms.

The

(electoral
31

and

focus

on

structural

administrative

and

reform,

constitution

writing,

stabilization,

et

selection

cetera)

has

of

new

elites,

macro-economic

many

anti-democratic

obscured

elements driving the political transformation of the former East
European regimes. 54
The feminist lesson to be derived from this analysis is that
liberalism and

democracy are

inherently antithetical

concepts:

liberalism focuses on "freedom," while democracy seeks "equality."
The former, unfortunately, seems to have outlived its usefulness in
helping women to secure the latter.

Equality of opportunity works

only as long as there are sufficient opportunities to go around
",

(see the current US debate over Affirmative Action).

Thus, it is

the gendered nature of liberalism that imposes gender-limits on
democracy.

Neither the

liberal creed,

nor

its

institutional-

systemic correlate, democracy, can be reconciled with a reliance on
gender,

reproduction

and

ethnicity

as

natural-law

categories.

Social engineering is inherently anti-democratic, irrespective of
whether it is the aim of government to mold "socialist personalities" or to mandate a priori gender roles.
Defined in predominantly institutional terms, democracy has
indeed meant a

restoration of formal

political rights

for the

citizens of Eastern Europe, but it has done so in a way that has
remasculinized
sphere.

the

public

sphere

by

refeminizing

the

private

Institutions historically conceived and created for the

purpose of fostering societal pluralism are being used to promote
an idea of the nation and, with that, a concept of women's citizenship, that is exclusive and inferior in nature.

dilemma"

cannot

be

reduced

to

a

consideration

Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation,

for "the democratization of

The "democratic
of

System

divorced from a need

relations" between women and men. 55
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There can be no free men until there are free women.
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